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Introduction

This book traces the emergence and transformation of a German liberal move
ment in the Habsburg monarchy. In mid-nineteenth-century Austria men and
women, largely of Burger social origins, forged a political movement that chal
lenged the legitimacy of the reigning systems of government. Calling them
selves “liberals,” they mounted a revolutionary campaign in 1848 to establish
their own rule over Austrian society. The ensuing struggles between liberalism
and its various opponents were political in the broadest sense of the word. They
were as much about establishing an alternative system of values and cultural
practices in Austrian society as they were about mastering specific political
institutions.
The liberals fought their battles using two strategies. The first of these pro
duced an interregional political culture meant to serve as an alternative to the
stifling rule of bureaucratic absolutism during the Vormdrz. Organized through
independent voluntary associations, this political culture became a means for
building, coordinating, and controlling participation in politics by the Volk. The
other strategy involved the deployment of a powerful public rhetoric developed
by liberals to justify their revolution. Starting in 1848 with an explosion in print
culture and the proliferation of voluntary associations, the values and percep
tions associated with liberalism gradually came to dominate public discourse in
the Habsburg monarchy. They remained a cultural force to be reckoned with
long after the official liberal parties had declined in the 1890s.
Despite severe setbacks in the years following 1848, their strategies paid
off in the 1860s as Austrian liberals enjoyed some success in their efforts to
transform social and government institutions. In 1867 they imposed a consti
tution largely of their own making on an unwilling emperor, thereby ending the
historic dominance of local politics by the bureaucracy, the nobility, and
the Catholic Church. They established a system of compulsory education for
Austrian youth, substantially reducing the influence of the church over curricu
lum and instruction. Already in the 1870s it was apparent that these victories
had brought enormous changes to Austrian social and political life. Liberal po
litical parties came to dominate local and state institutions in many parts of the
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monarchy, while their economic and social reform projects often transformed
sleepy provincial landscapes into booming centers of industrial production.
At the same time, liberal cultural values gradually gained broad accept
ance in urban Austrian society. Most of these—ideas about market compe
tition, individual self-improvement, personal respectability, and a confident
rationalism—rested on the fundamental belief that the economically inde
pendent individual was the productive cornerstone of public life. It was this
individual’s financial and intellectual independence that gained for him the
rights of active citizenship. The logic behind this concept of active public citi
zenship implied the existence of a complementary realm as well, however, one
inhabited by passive, dependent individuals who lacked the vision that sup
posedly derived from intellectual maturity and financial independence. De
spite the equal status assigned to all people by a liberal rhetoric of universal
citizenship, active citizens maintained implicitly hierarchic relationships with
the women and children, as well as racial and class inferiors. The presumed
inability of the latter to use reason consigned them to passive rights of citizen
ship. The ideological and juridical distance separating the denizens of these two
spheres was simultaneously profound and insignificant, according to the liberal
worldview. It was profound because passive citizens could never, as such,
enjoy active rights of participation. Yet this gulf was also insignificant since
basic human nature gave at least some of these passive citizens the tools for
eventually earning the rights of active citizenship.
Starting with revolutionary events in 1848, liberal rhetoric about society
reconciled any apparent contradiction between fundamental human equality
and the political necessity of retaining distinctions between active and passive
forms of citizenship. The success of this rhetoric reflected the liberals’ ability
to connect the social practices with the beliefs of a politically frustrated urban
Burgertum inside their new political organizational structures. Common prac
tice in local voluntary associations shaped the new liberal rhetoric, thereby
ensuring the increasing popularity of such rhetoric throughout much of the so
cially and regionally diverse Habsburg monarchy. The combination of liberal
ideology with an emerging liberal political culture provided both rhetorical
and real spaces for the mediation of liberalism’s two powerful yet often con
tradictory urges in nineteenth-century Austria: between egalitarian demands
for individual empowerment and the property owner’s desire to prevent poten
tially dangerous social change.
Another enduring legacy of liberal discourse about society, one that
continues to dominate the political cultures of Central Europe today, was the
creation of a nationalist identity politics among German bourgeois activists.'
1. I do not wish to imply here that German nationalism developed outside the context of
other earlier and aggressive forms of nationalism like that of the Czechs. Nevertheless, I want to
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Since its appearance, scholars have framed German nationalism m nineteenthcentury Austria, particularly its more radical varieties, as fundamentally op
posed to liberal principles and practices. Contemporary observers and later
historians alike attributed the very decline of political liberalism m the 1880s
to the simultaneous political mobilization brought about by Gemian nation
alist activism. This book challenges that view, arguing that liberal rhetonc and
organizational practice actually determined the shape and content of national
ist mass politics well into the twentieth century. The liberals themselves created
a powerful new politics organized around nationalist identity in order to re
pulse the growing threats to their local hegemony, threats that were increas
ingly couched in nation-based (the Czechs), class-based (socialism), or racebased (anti-Semitism) discourse. Liberal rhetoric about society provided a
crucial ideological foundation for the later explosion of German nationalist
politics at the end of the nineteenth century, as activists transformed their ideas
about the social differences that separated the spheres of active and passive
citizenship into beliefs about national differences. The liberal
spheres of active and passive citizenship itself was transformed by 1900 into a
discourse about cultural and, later, often racial difference. Even the Geimart
radical and anti-Semitic groups that challenged liberal hegemony m the 1880s
and 1890s simply promised to carry out liberal nationalist commitments more
cffcctivclv.
Historians have generally ignored these proofs of liberalism s underly
ing vitality to focus more narrowly on the Liberal Party’s apparent inability to
survive in an age of mass-based suffrage and political mobilization. Dwelling
on Austrian liberalism’s brief parliamentary history, they have treated lib
eralism largely as an unchanging ideological phenomenon with few natural
constituents beyond an elitist upper bourgeoisie. Certainly the liberal parties
faltered at the parliamentary level after 1880, and the uncritical acceptance of
several traditional liberal values declined. A decade of harsh economic depres
sion and the growing perceptions of a corrupt opportunism within the liberal
parties weakened popular belief in liberalism’s utopian promises and suggested
that liberal rhetoric did not always match liberal actions. By 1900, the once
powerful liberal movement seemed curiously spent as a political force m Aus
tria The liberal parties, once the largest bloc in parliament, all but disappe^ed
to be replaced by regional and nationalist interest groups. Unlike other liber^
parties in Europe that managed to maintain some parliamentary presence well
into the twentieth century, the Austrian liberals seem to have been completely
eclipsed by the rise of mass socialist. Catholic, and nationalist populist parties
on the left and right of the political spectrum.
stress the ways in which liberal and radical forms of German nationalism derived both their orga
nizational style and their ideological content from liberalism and its traditions.
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This parliamentary decline, however, represents only a small part of the
story and one that was played out primarily in the imperial metropole Vienna.^
If one approaches liberalism from the perspective of the regional political
cultures it created, the narrative looks very different. Liberal political culture
seems to have reinvented itself frequently, adapting its influential social
rhetoric and organizational practices to dramatically changing circumstances
as it tried to maintain its power to order local society. From this viewpoint,
the central drama of Austrian liberalism becomes the challenge to alter its prac
tices in order to maintain its social hegemony, not its parliamentary defeat
at the hands of the populist parties. Outside Vienna it was the liberals, not their
populist opponents, who politicized ethnic and gender differences most suc
cessfully in the 1880s by forging a new mass politics organized around na
tionalism. In Austria, German nationalism came to serve a political function
closely resembling that of early liberalism, namely to consolidate Burger hege
mony in local politics by demanding social unity at all costs. Nationalism
helped to mediate an attempted trasformismo from traditionally elite liberal
politics to a controlled form of mass politics under the watchful eye of Biitger
elites. By the late nineteenth century, German nationalism often augmented lib
eralism as a worldview that promoted social harmony and the protection of
property among a Biirgertum whose social parameters were increasingly more
broadly defined.
Starting in the 1880s the few historians who wrote about Austrian lib
eralism approached it from the vantage point of its spectacular parliamen
tary decline. Reacting with bitterness to their loss of parliamentary power,
nineteenth-century liberal observers criticized the apparent short-sightedness
of their leaders, citing factionalism as the major reason for the movement’s
downfall. These accounts dwelt on the excessive personal pride and greed dis
played by party leaders, as well as their noticeable want of political acumen.^
2, This is one problem, for example, with John Boyer’s observations about liberalism in
Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement,

JS4S-JS97 (Chicago, 1981).
3. Harry Ritter, “Austro-German Liberalism and the Modem Liberal Tradition,” German
Studies Review 1 (1984): 227-47. Ritter points out that “the terms and metaphors which control
present-day discourse about nineteenth-century [Austrian] liberalism are, to a great extent, taken
over directly from the figurative language of pathology invented in some cases ... by insecure or
disillusioned turn-of-the-century liberals themselves.” Journalist historians who wrote from this
point of view include Heinrich Friedjung, Heinrich Poliak, Ferdinand von Krones, and Richard
Charmatz. Charmatz’s Deutsch-Osterreichische PoUtik: Studien iiber den Liberalismus und iiber
die Auswdrtige Politik Osterreichs (Leipzig, 1907) is one of the best of the early surveys. In the
1950s, Georg Franz published an exhaustive work on liberalism in the 1860s, Liberalismus. Die
deutschliberale Bewegung in der habsburgischen Monarchie (Munich, 1955). Although sympa
thetic in tone, the book combines the tragic self-diagnosis of turn-of-the-century liberal authors
with a more nationalist and occasionally anti-Semitic viewpoint. Karl Eder’s Der Liberalismus in
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Other historians with liberal sympathies blamed the movement’s decline on
the rapid rise of political nationalism at the end of the century. These observers
believed that the rise of nationalism in the ethnically diverse monarchy even
tually robbed political liberalism of its core urban constituencies. In both the
First and Second Republics, the handful of nationalist voters who refused to
support either the socialist or Catholic parties are still viewed as the missing
constituents of liberalism.'*
After the Second World War and particularly in the 1960s, Austrian liber
alism fell victim to another powerful historical interpretation, the Sonderweg,
or “exceptional route,” theory of German development.^ Although this inter
pretation has been adequately criticized on both theoretical and empirical
grounds by several historians of Germany, it is worth briefly pointing out how
it has come to influence Austrian historiography. In the 1960s, several histori
ans of Germany began looking explicitly to nineteenth-century political culture
for keys to understanding the rise of authoritarianism in the 1930s. The “ex
ceptional route” model explained twentieth-century fascism by charting the
ways in which so-called preindustrial social and cultural patterns of behavior in
the spheres of society and politics survived well into the “modem” era. An un
usually weak bourgeoisie, unable to promote its own “modem” ways of doing
business against the force of traditional elites, supposedly adapted itself to the
mling, “semifeudal” stractures of public life.® Historians who promoted this
view based it on several kinds of decontextualized sociological evidence, such
as, for example, the authoritarian behavior of German industrial employers
Altosterreich: Geisteshaltung, Politik, und Kultur (Munich: 1955) takes an unsympathetic, Catholic

political approach.
4. This interpretation accorded well with a larger theory of political continuity that has
served, since the 1950s, as the privileged explanation for past and present conflict in Austrian po
litical life. That theory views the Austrian electorate as historically divided into three, generally
unchanging voting blocs: Catholic, socialist and liberal/nationalist. Adam Wandruszka, “Osterreichs politische Struktur; die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen,” Geschichte
der Republik Osterreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna, 1954), 291-485. It is important to note
that while this theory appears to describe political behavior in the first and second Austrian Re
publics adequately, it completely ignores the political behavior of German speakers in other parts of
the monarchy such as Bohemia and Moravia, which had been important centers of Liberal Party
strength.
5. David Blackboum and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford, 1984);
Eley, “What Produces Fascism: Pre-Industrial Traditions or a Crisis of the Capitalist State?” in his
From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston, 1986), 254-82; Richard J.
Evans, Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the Origins of the Third
Reich (London, 1987), 23-92; Robert G. Moeller, “The Kaiserreich Recast?” Journal of Social
History, 1984, 655-83.
6. The most influential work to develop this approach is Ralf Dahrendorf’s Society and
Democracy in Germany (London, 1968). See also Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dicta
torship and Democracy (London, 1967).
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toward their workers, which they attributed to the survival of feudal traditions.
In this example as with so many others, historians overlooked the possibility
that such workplace behaviors may have had quite modem origins and may
have suited the particular needs of German capital, particularly given the
strength of organized labor in Germany.’
Sonderweg historians also held up the achievement of fully democratic
parliamentary political institutions as a critical standard by which the success or
failure of nineteenth-century liberal movements ought to be measured. This
anachronistic reading misrepresented the political philosophy and social goals
of nineteenth-century liberals and misunderstood the critical distinction be
tween public civic equality and private hierarchy that underlay liberal be
liefs about political democratization. Few liberals, whether British, French,
German, or Austrian, felt comfortable enough with the idea of political democ
racy to support the immediate extension of unrestricted suffrage to the working
classes. Liberals could not even agree on extending the suffrage to middle-class
women. And as several historians have repeatedly pointed out, Britain, that
paragon of liberal development, introduced universal manhood suffrage long
after Germany had done so.®
Comparative analysis in the last decade has at least relativized the more
ahistorical claims of the Sonderweg approach. Yet troublesome questions re
main regarding the assumed links between twentieth-century authoritarianism
and earlier forms of social organization. Those links may be well worth pursu
ing precisely because they indicate phenomena too complex to be explained
away simply in terms of the survival of traditional elites. If elements of Austrian
corporatism or fascism developed from nineteenth-century antecedents, those
antecedents may reflect modem responses to nineteenth-century conditions and
not the remnants of feudal culture. Blind to this possibility, however, most Son
derweg historians attributed fascism’s appeal to the survival in Central Europe
of traditional authoritarian social elites who had supposedly vanquished a weak
nascent liberalism in the nineteenth century. Often taking fascism at its own
word, they stressed its conservative ideological critique of liberal, individualist
capitalism while playing down its strong anti-trade unionist policies and its ob
session with the protection of individual property rights and bourgeois family
norms. The label totalitarianism, popularized during the 1950s, aided this fic
tion by lumping German fascism together with Soviet communism in a general
category clearly opposed to the more advanced liberal individualism upheld by
7. For an elaboration of this point, see, for example, Dick Geary, “The Industrial Bour
geoisie and Labour Relations in Germany 1871-1933,” in The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the
Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Cen
tury, ed. David Blackbourn and Richard Evans (London and New York, 1991).
8. Geoff Eley, “Liberalism, Europe, and the Bourgeoisie 1860-1914,” in The German
Bourgeoisie, ed. Blackbourn and Evans, 296-7, 299-300.
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the United States and Western Europe. Both fascism and coinmunism, it was
claimed, developed in backward societies with politically weak middle classes
and surviving traditions of authoritarian rule.’
. , ...
c
Most historians located liberalism’s specific failure in its inabi ity to forge
democratic change from the revolutions that f
‘
1848_49. This was the critical moment at which, in the words of A. . ^ .
y ’
history reached its turning point and then, in Germany and Austna, failed to
turn ’^0 The liberals ought to have destroyed the power of the traditional elites
(or at least badly damaged it), as had their British and French counterparts.
Instead the story goes, their failure to impose more democratic political insti
tutions on the Austrian monarchy proved that they lacked the robust dynamisrn
of their British or French counterparts. This apparent failure and thc resilie^
of the dynasty, aristocracy and army held serious consequences for Austria s
later developLnt. Small wonder that Austrian liberalism, beset by nationahs
and class conflict and with little apparent popular support, failed m the ta
Kocr, ^
historians (if not history) set for it."
The picture of a backward and doomed Habsburg monarchy has been re
inforced by a teleological view of national conflict in Austna-Hungary. In its
flnal years, nationalist strife appears to have overwhelmed the empire and
posed a serious obstacle to the kind of reasoned political discourse favored by
fiberal middle-class groups. The sheer inevitability of ethnic
argued, made the question of liberal options or achievements largely irrelevant
Noting the power of this line of thought, one historian has recently observed
that “Ideas of what was possible for nineteenth-century Austnan liberalism
colored by conventional ideas about what was possible for the old empire. If
we believe the empire was ‘destined’ to collapse, this is likely to affect our ap
proach to liberalism and its
nnA!l«ilv
The fact that so many national groups seem to have coexisted unea y
in a single state makes the monarchy appear qualitatively different from its
neighbors to the north and west. Nationalist conflict, it is imagined, had to ex-

=nrvpv of this literature with special emphasis on economic arguments.
survey of th.i™^
^
History since 1815 (London, 1945), 68; Blackboum and Eley, The Peculiarities of German History,

11 The pervasive influence of Carl Schorske’s brilliant Fin de siecle Vienna: PoMc^
Culture (New yL, 1980), which relies on several of these assumptions about Austrian liberalism,
testifies to their continuing ability to persuade.
. , j ki,. ,-fforts of several histo12 Ritter “Austro-German Liberalism,” 232. Despite the laudable efforts of several histo
rians to challeng; this approach, it remains powerful, partially due to the contemporary importance
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plode because this state was not a trae nation state organized around a single
national group. Yet if anything, recent scholarship has taught us to view the
traditional nationalist claims of France, Germany, or Italy with some skepti
cism and to ask how nineteenth-century state policy actually created national
citizens out of radically diverse local populations. Is it not finally time to see
the Habsburg monarchy in the same terms as those other states?
In the last fifteen years, new historical work on state, economy, and soci
ety in Austria and Germany has helped substantially to modify these rather
extreme views. Studies of regional economies and markets have revealed the
underlying strength of capitalist transformation and industrial development
in many parts of the monarchy, placing regions like Bohemia and Lower Aus
tria within the context of Western European trends. Comparative analyses have
also demonstrated the rather obvious point that capitalist economic systems do
not necessarily require a British or American political model in order to flour
ish. Ironically, some historians now suggest that the survival of traditional
elites was stronger in Britain than usually admitted, while in Central Europe a
thriving bourgeois class exercised a variety of powers in unexpected ways.
Scholarship on Austria has especially benefited from new approaches to the
study of social groups loosely defined as Burger and their often hidden but
nonetheless effective means of defining their interests and exerting influence.
Regional social histories have revealed the complex associational networks
that structured middle-class social life in the nineteenth century. Traditionally
viewed as a source of social division in Central Europe, the voluntary associ
ation actually helped middle-class Austrians to formulate and disseminate
common social and cultural norms. The associations constituted a middle-class
public sphere where interregional issues could be recast in terms of local iden
tities and struggles.
Austrian scholars themselves have recently initiated a series of ambi
tious international projects designed to study the social origins and developing
cultures of various Burger and Mittelstand groups in all parts of the former
monarchy. Yet relatively little of this excellent new work has yielded a dis
cussion of Burger political culture. Instead, most historians of this highly
variegated Burgertum focus on regional class formation without class poli
tics. The student of the period is left with carefully nuanced insights into an
emerging bourgeois world, insights that coexist uncomfortably with more rudiof ethnic identity in Central and Eastern European politics. Some of the more thoughtful revision
ist work on the issue of nationalism in the monarchy includes Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of
Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914 (Princeton, 1981); Istvan Deak, Beyond Nation
alism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848-1918 (New York and
Oxford, 1990); Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Eco
nomic and Ethnic Change (Berkeley, 1983).
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mentary knowledge of that world’s various means of political expression.'^ It
is not as if good models were not available for the kind of work that would
connect class formation to class politics. Fifteen years ago, groundbreaking
books by American scholars Gary B. Cohen and John W. Boyer had already
presented superb local studies of Burger political culture in Prague and Vienna.
My own approach challenges several common interpretations of lib
eralism in Central Europe, particularly the importance it assigns to the culture
of the voluntary association. This focus should redress the exaggerated orienta
tion of the literature toward the atypical experience of liberals in Vienna and
develop a more nuanced view of liberalism’s relation to German political na
tionalism in the late nineteenth century. A standard explanation for the apparent
political failure of Austrian liberalism is that it lacked indigenous roots and
was established by a socially isolated group of intellectuals and ideologues
who imported it from France and Britain.''* Austrian liberals were never such
dry theorists whose ideas had no practical application to Austrian conditions.
On the contrary, and this is perhaps the most important point, their liberalism
expressed the powerful yearnings of Austrian BUrger for institutional legitima
tion of their contributions to society, for control over their local polity, and for
the security necessary to pursue their economic goals. An examination of the
political culture that emerged from associational life demonstrates the ways in
which the liberals’ worldview originated largely in their particular organiza
tional experience.
This book’s focus on political culture also helps to address larger ques
tions about the extent of the collective social and political power exercised
by the Biirgertum in the nineteenth-century Habsburg monarchy. The urban
middle-class battle to legitimate and institutionalize its hitherto informal influ
ence in local social relations constituted the most successful element of an
ongoing bourgeois revolution in Austrian society in the 1860s and 1870s. Lib
erals of all varieties, from conservative to radical, may have suffered political
defeat in 1848, but their particular notions of public virtue, their myths of com
munity, their visions of economic development gradually came to dominate
Austrian public life, even in the darkest years of the post-1848 reaction. Histo
rians of Austrian liberalism have typically pointed to the success or failure of
specific political reforms as a standard by which to evaluate this revolution.
Rather than view the bourgeois revolution in such narrow terms, however, I
13. Ernst Bruckmuller, Ulrike Docker, Hannes Stekl, Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Biirgertum in
der Habsburgermonarchie (Vienna, 1990); Hannes Stekl, Peter Urbanitsch, Ernst Bruckmuller,
Hans Heiss, eds., “Durch Arbeit, Besitz, Wissen und Gerechtigkeit. ’’ Biirgertum in der Habsburg
ermonarchie II (yienia, 1992).
14. Franz, Liberalismus. Throughout his book, Franz treats liberalism’s emphasis on indi
vidualism as a Western import alien to Central European thought and conditions.
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believe it makes far more sense to approach nineteenth-century European so
cieties in terms of ongoing contested relations of political and social power
fought at several different levels.*^ In Austria as elsewhere in Europe, few of the
struggles that pitted the middle classes against the crown, nobility, military, and
bureaucracy were limited to the arena of formal politics, and very few of these
struggles resulted in absolute victory or defeat for any one group. Nevertheless,
if the particular strengths or weaknesses of the Austro-German Biirgertum must
be understood in a context of unresolved struggles for mastery in nineteenthcentury Austrian society, it was a liberal discourse about society that per
sistently set the terms for these contests.

15. David Blackbourn, “The Discrete Charm of the German Bourgeoisie,” in his Populists
and Patricians: Essays in Modern German History (London, 1987), 73. For an extreme and prob
lematic statement of bourgeois weakness throughout Europe, which nevertheless helps to correct
ideas about Central European exceptionalism, see Arno Mayer’s provocative The Persistence of
the Old Regime. Europe to the Great War (New York, 1981). David Blackbourn has noted with
regard to the German example, “one should be wary of assuming that the bourgeoisie simply suc
cumbed to the aristocratic embrace. What matters is the terms on which this symbiosis of old and
new took place. This is not easy to determine. But at least we should not confuse the form with the
substance: much of its behavior illustrated the buoyancy as much as the capitulation of the
German bourgeoisie.”

